Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
This has nothing to do with HOAs. I just want to publicize this report from the Silverman-Robb Commission, so that people can put in perspective the recent revival of the "Bush lies" rhetoric about the Iraq war and the missing WMDs.

I have posted here (italicized below) the main conclusion of the Commission, which had all the President's daily briefings and other intelligence he relied on. See if you can find there, or anywhere in the report, any indication that President Bush lied to the public or browbeat the intelligence agencies of the USA, France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy into submission. What you find instead is a conclusion that US intelligence agencies believed, and told the President and members of Congress, that the WMDs were there.

That's why the President believed Saddam had the weapons. That's why most of the Republicans and Democrats in both houses of Congress believed it, too.

Now, Democrats are claiming that Bush somehow "knew" the weapons weren't there, but said they were there, so he could get a vote for war. This is completely implausible. How could Bush have known the weapons weren't there, when the agencies he relied upon were telling him the weapons were there? Upon what factual basis would he have disbelieved this overwhelming consensus?

And if he believed what the intelligence agencies were telling him--that the weapons were there--then he wasn't lying, was he?

So, here's the main conclusion of the Commission:

On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community. And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over.
While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, in the end it was the United States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most public--and most damaging--intelligence failures in recent American history.
This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam's intentions. But it was also a failure on the part of those who collect intelligence--CIA's and the Defense Intelligence Agency 's (DIA) spies, the National Security Agency 's (NSA) eavesdroppers, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 's (NGA) imagery experts.1 In the end, those agencies collected precious little intelligence for the analysts to analyze, and much of what they did collect was either worthless or misleading. Finally, it was a failure to communicate effectively with policymakers; the Intelligence Community didn't adequately explain just how little good intelligence it had--or how much its assessments were driven by assumptions and inferences rather than concrete evidence.